Does Haig deserve the title The Butcher of the Somme Essay Example

Does Haig deserve the title The Butcher of the Somme Essay Example Does Haig deserve the title The Butcher of the Somme Paper Does Haig deserve the title The Butcher of the Somme Paper Essay Topic: History In this essay, I will try to figure out what historians all over the world have been talking about for years: Does Sir Douglas William Haig deserve the title The Butcher of the Somme? I will start by correctly defining the term, butcher, before analysing the case for and against this statement. I will finally conclude my essay by weighing up the two cases and comparing the definitions of butcher to his actions. To say that Haig was the hero of the victory at the Somme, although the opinion of the people of the time, must now be looked back on with great scepticism. You cannot deny that Haig made the correct tactical decision to make an offensive at the Somme, in order to take the pressure of Verdun, and it is true to say that he achieved his target objective in doing so. However, it is inexcusable, whatever the gain, to throw away life so carelessly as Haig did. It is also to be noted, that Haigs attitude after the Somme, was that it was a worthy sacrifice, and an honourable way for a man to die. In other words, he didnt care about the loses, as long as he got the praise at the end of it all. It is obvious that to tell the men to walk across no-mans land must be looked at as the ultimate cause for the slaughter of the Somme. It was Haig who gave the order to walk and formulated the strategy for the offensive. His plan was flawed. Firstly he didnt consider all possibilities, the only outcome that he had planned and accommodated for was that everything went according to plan. This was clearly not the case as he didnt consider that the Explosions under the German line were all going to be synchronized, or that the Germans might survive in their dugouts. Also, and even more disastrous, he didnt have a plan B. What this means is, suggesting that not everything goes well, and say the Germans did survive in their dugouts, he didnt have any alternative plan to revert to, he just kept on with the same disastrous strategy, and judging by the fact that he continued with the same plan for 2 months, it seems unlikely that he had a plan B for any outcome, which means that he was relyin g on everything going according to plan a very bad tactical decision. Haig could have easily changed his plans when he realized they werent having any affect and he was throwing lives away, for example (and this is my plan): Began the bombardment again and this time ran across, the barbed wire was a problem but the Irish got through the first time when they ran, so it was definitely possible. And also, the whole objective of the Somme was to take the pressure off Verdun, so once the Germans had dragged half their army up to deal with the Somme, the British had no need to attack them, they could just sit and wait, the Germans werent going anywhere because they knew that they would be vulnerable and could be attacked at any time with all the British soldiers just waiting, the last thing the Germans were going to do was just leave and go back to Verdun, and if they did, (which would be crazy) then the offensive could begin, and attack the weakened lines. However, these plans were obviously made when looking back on the battle, Haig wouldnt have had the lu xury of hindsight. Although, he is to blame for not changing his tactics when the 1st day had been such a failure. When something you try clearly doesnt work, why keep doing it at the cost of lives? After all, the only reason that Haig gave the order to walk was because he was under the false impression that all the Germans had been killed in the bombardment and the men would be walking straight through the trenches to Berlin. It is for this reason that the men were carrying 30 pounds of pack on their shoulders, and were told that they were walking towards empty trenches. However, when this clearly wasnt the case, and it was obvious that they were not walking towards empty trenches, why carry on walking if the only reason for doing so is now void? Haigs mentality is also to be questioned, as his attitude towards human life is simply shocking. His attacking initiative ideas where men are simply thrown over the top on little raiding parties of 10 or 15 people, were madness. Every group died and was just another target for the Germans to shoot down. They had absolutely no hope of succeeding and he knew it. He was just throwing away lives when he knew all who went over the top would die. This may or may not have created an attacking spirit, but what good is an attacking spirit when the men are sent over the top to die? I cant see how the deaths of their friends could possibly create an attacking spirit, the only thing it would create was the impression that there General was a complete maniac. There is no use in raising the morale of troops who are going to die anyway, and surely victories would create a better morale boost for the men than constant casualties. Imagine this: You are a middle aged lady in England and you are proud to say to all your friends that your husband has gone to fight for his country. You are then informed that he has been killed in action. After the war, you find out that he was killed in a raiding party, all to raise the morale slightly of men on the front line. You think to yourselfoh, wont they be happy! Im sure his life was a worthy sacrifice and the other men had high spirits for the next week, to know that another 15 people had been sent over the top and died. Haig said, the day before the offensive: The men are in splendid spirits. Several have said that they have never before seen so instructed and informed of the nature of the operation before them. The barbed wire has never been so well cut, nor the artillery preparation so thorough. All the commanders are full of confidence. This statement in itself tells the story. Haig was either miss-informed or delusional, and despite the fact that the wire was clearly not cut, he sent the men out anyway.

Navajo Code Talkers

Navajo Code Talkers In United States history, the story of Native Americans is predominantly tragic. Settlers took their land, misunderstood their customs, and killed them in the thousands. Then, during World War II, the U.S. government needed the Navajos help. And though they had suffered greatly from this same government, Navajos proudly answered the call to duty. Communication is essential during any war and World War II was no different. From battalion to battalion or ship to ship - everyone must stay in contact to know when and where to attack or when to fall back. If the enemy were to hear these tactical conversations, not only would the element of surprise be lost, but the enemy could also reposition and get the upper hand. Codes (encryptions) were essential to protect these conversations. Unfortunately, though codes were often used, they were also frequently broken. In 1942, a man named Philip Johnston thought of a code he thought unbreakable by the enemy. A code based on the Navajo language. Philip Johnstons Idea The son of a Protestant missionary, Philip Johnston spent much of his childhood on the Navajo reservation. He grew up with Navajo children, learning their language and their customs. As an adult, Johnston became an engineer for the city of Los Angeles but also spent a considerable amount of his time lecturing about the Navajos. Then one day, Johnston was reading the newspaper when he noticed a story about an armored division in Louisiana that was attempting to come up with a way to code military communications using Native American personnel. This story sparked an idea. The next day, Johnston headed to Camp Elliot (near San Diego) and presented his idea for a code to Lt. Col. James E. Jones, the Area Signal Officer. Lt. Col. Jones was skeptical. Previous attempts at similar codes failed because Native Americans had no words in their language for military terms. There was no need for Navajos to add a word in their language for tank or machine gun just as there is no reason in English to have different terms for your mothers brother and your fathers brother - as some languages do - theyre just both called uncle. And often, when new inventions are created, other languages just absorb the same word. For example, in German a radio is called Radio and a computer is Computer. Thus, Lt. Col. Jones was concerned that if they used any Native American languages as codes, the word for machine gun would become the English word machine gun - making the code easily decipherable. However, Johnston had another idea. Instead of adding the direct term machine gun to the Navajo language, they would designate a word or two already in the Navajo language for the military term. For example, the term for machine gun became rapid-fire gun, the term for battleship became whale, and the term for fighter plane became hummingbird. Lt. Col. Jones recommended a demonstration for Major General Clayton B. Vogel. The demonstration was a success and Major General Vogel sent a letter to the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps recommending that they enlist 200 Navajos for this assignment. In response to the request, they were only given permission to begin a pilot project with 30 Navajos. Getting the Program Started Recruiters visited the Navajo reservation and selected the first 30 code talkers (one dropped out, so 29 started the program). Many of these young Navajos had never been off the reservation, making their transition to military life even more difficult. Yet they persevered. They worked night and day helping to create the code and to learn it. Once the code was created, the Navajo recruits were tested and re-tested. There could be no mistakes in any of the translations. One mistranslated word could lead to the death of thousands. Once the first 29 were trained, two remained behind to become instructors for future Navajo code talkers and the other 27 were sent to Guadalcanal to be the first to use the new code in combat. Having not gotten to participate in the creation of the code because he was a civilian, Johnston volunteered to enlist if he could participate in the program. His offer was accepted and Johnston took over the training aspect of the program. The program proved successful and soon the U.S. Marine Corps authorized unlimited recruiting for the Navajo code talkers program. The entire Navajo nation consisted of 50,000 people and by the end of the war 420 Navajo men worked as code talkers. The Code The initial code consisted of translations for 211 English words most frequently used in military conversations. Included in the list were terms for officers, terms for airplanes, terms for months, and an extensive general vocabulary. Also included were Navajo equivalents for the English alphabet so that the code talkers could spell out names or specific places. However, cryptographer Captain Stilwell suggested that the code be expanded. While monitoring several transmissions, he noticed that since so many words had to be spelled out, the repetition of the Navajo equivalents for each letter could possibly offer the Japanese an opportunity to decipher the code. Upon Captain Silwells suggestion, an additional 200 words and additional Navajo equivalents for the 12 most often used letters (A, D, E, I, H, L, N, O, R, S, T, U) were added. The code, now complete, consisted of 411 terms. On the battlefield, the code was never written down, it was always spoken. In training, they had been repeatedly drilled with all 411 terms. The Navajo code talkers had to be able to send and receive the code as fast as possible. There was no time for hesitation. Trained and now fluent in the code, the Navajo code talkers were ready for battle. On the Battlefield Unfortunately, when the Navajo code was first introduced, military leaders in the field were skeptical. Many of the first recruits had to prove the codes worth. However, with just a few examples, most commanders were grateful for the speed and accuracy in which messages could be communicated. From 1942 until 1945, Navajo code talkers participated in numerous battles in the Pacific, including Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Peleliu, and Tarawa. They not only worked in communications but also as regular soldiers, facing the same horrors of war as other soldiers. However, Navajo code talkers met additional problems in the field. Too often, their own soldiers mistook them for Japanese soldiers. Many were nearly shot because of this. The danger and frequency of misidentification caused some commanders to order a bodyguard for each Navajo code talker. For three years, wherever the Marines landed, the Japanese got an earful of strange gurgling noises interspersed with other sounds resembling the call of a Tibetan monk and the sound of a hot water bottle being emptied.Huddled over their radio sets in bobbing assault barges, in foxholes on the beach, in slit trenches, deep in the jungle, the Navajo Marines transmitted and received messages, orders, vital information. The Japanese ground their teeth and committed hari-kari.* The Navajo code talkers played a large role in the Allied success in the Pacific. The Navajos had created a code the enemy was unable to decipher. * Excerpt from the September 18, 1945 issues of the San Diego Union as quoted in Doris A. Paul, The Navajo Code Talkers (Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co., 1973) 99. Bibliography Bixler, Margaret T. Winds of Freedom: The Story of the Navajo Code Talkers of World War II. Darien, CT: Two Bytes Publishing Company, 1992.Kawano, Kenji. Warriors: Navajo Code Talkers. Flagstaff, AZ: Northland Publishing Company, 1990.Paul, Doris A. The Navajo Code Talkers. Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co., 1973.